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In 1932, Rudolf Carnap published his article “Psychology in a Physical Language.” 
The article prompted a critical response by the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker. 
The exchange is marked by mutual lack of comprehension. In this paper I will 
provide a contextualized explication of the exchange. I will show that Carnap’s 
physicalism was deeply rooted in the psychophysical tradition that also informed 
Gestalt psychological research. By failing to acknowledge this, Carnap missed out on 
the possibility to enter into a serious debate and to forge an alliance with a like-
minded psychologist at the time. I conclude by suggesting that the kind of 
physicalism practiced by Gestalt psychologists deserves to be taken seriously by 
current philosophy of psychology. 
 
In the early 1930s, Rudolf Carnap laid down his project of overcoming metaphysics by means of 
linguistic analysis (Carnap 1931a) and specified a universal (physical) language as the language 
of choice (Carnap 1931b). It is well known that Carnap’s 1931b article gave rise to what is often 
referred to as the “protocol-language debate” within the Vienna Circle (Neurath 1932; Carnap 
1932b). While there is some impressive historical and philosophical scholarship about this debate 
(e.g., Uebel 2007), one strand of it has not received much attention, namely the ways in which 
Carnap’s views about the physicalizability of protocol sentences were related to research in 
experimental psychology at the time. This is especially surprising given the fact that Carnap, in 
his article “Psychology in a Physical Language” (1932a) attempted to spell out the implications 
of this view for psychology. This article was met by a critical response by the psychologist Karl 
Duncker (1932), which in turn prompted a reply from Carnap (1932c). The exchange is 
characterized by a surprising degree of mutual incomprehension, with Duncker suggesting that 
Carnap’s critique of (introspective) psychology was attacking a strawman and Carnap saying that 
Duncker had completely missed his point. 
In this article I will explicate and contextualize the exchange between Carnap and Duncker. I will 
shed some light on the reasons why the two talked past each other and I will show that Duncker 
did put his finger on the fact that (1) Carnap’s position failed to address scientific practice, and 




that (2) Carnap did indeed attack several strawmen. I will lay out that Carnap’s turn to a physical 
language was motivated by his aim to provide an objective foundation for protocol sentences 
(section 2), and argue that the way in which Carnap executed his project of physicalizing 
protocol-sentences was deeply informed by psychophysics (section 3). I will then (in section 4) 
turn to Carnap’s 1932a article “Psychology in a Physical Language,” where he claims to be 
addressing the implications of his views for psychology. Section 5 details Duncker’s response 
and Carnap’s answer. Finally, in section 6, I will draw out two underlying issues in this debate, 
i.e., (a) the status of introspection in psychological research, and (b) the question what (if any) 
metaphysical presuppositions were made by psychophysical research. 
 
2. Overcoming Metaphysics and the Problem of Experience 
In his famous article “Overcoming Metaphysics” Carnap laid out the very lean conception of 
philosophy characteristic of the Vienna Circle (Carnap 1931a). According to it, philosophy was 
neither to engage in metaphysical speculations about age-old topics, nor in naturalistic treatments 
of them. Rather, it was essentially reduced to providing meta-analyses of existing discourses in 
order to clean them of “pseudo-sentences;” sentences that look grammatically like sentences, but 
are in fact meaningless. The method of choice (logical analysis of language) was to proceed by 
translating every sentence that is formulated in the so-called “material mode of speech” into a 
sentence in the “formal mode of speech” (a sentence about a sentence). This method was to 
reveal whether a given statement was logically consistent and empirically meaningful. 
In response to the question of what it takes for a statement to be empirically meaningful, Carnap 
introduced a version of the well-known verificationist criterion of meaning that we still associate 
closely with the doctrine of logical positivism. According to it a word a is meaningful only if (1) 
empirical indicators for a are known, (2) it is known what protocol sentences the sentence S(a) 
can be derived from, and (3) the path towards verifying S(a) is known (Carnap 1931a, 224). 
Carnap’s verificationist semantics for words emphasized the empirical truth conditions for 
sentences in which the words occur. These empirical truth conditions were provided by 
“observational” or “protocol-sentences” and he stated that while there was to date no agreement 




about the form or content of such sentences, they were commonly thought to refer to something 
that is “given” (Carnap 1931a, 222). 
This raised the question of what were criteria of meaningfulness of protocol sentences 
themselves? Was their meaningfulness ensured by a primitive notion of the “given,” i.e., by the 
subjective experience that is – in the material mode – reported by protocol sentences? Or was 
there a more ‘public’ way of stating the truth conditions for protocol sentences? It is this question 
that Carnap addressed in his “Physical Language as the Universal Language of Science” (Carnap 
1931b), where he argued that both protocol sentences and “system sentences” (i.e., sentences 
capable of being derived from, and verified, by protocol sentences) are part of an overarching 
language: the universal language of science. By the requirement of universality, Carnap meant 
that such a language “can describe every state of affairs” (Carnap 1963 [1932a] 400). But in 
addition he argued that such a language should also be intersubjective, i.e., it should be usable by 
everybody in the same way. It is in this second respect that Carnap’s aim in this work differed 
from the one proposed in his 1928 Aufbau, where he had wanted the universal language to be that 
of subjective experience. It was because of the requirement of intersubjectivity that Carnap turned 
to the physical language as the universal language (see Uebel 2007).
1
 
Carnap’s thesis that (seemingly subjective) protocol sentences were translatable into the 
(intersubjective) language of physics was ostensibly part of a larger thesis, namely that all 
sentences are translatable into sentences of the physical language. Surprisingly, Carnap did not 
present an argument for this larger thesis, except to suggest that its truth was obvious, at least in 
the case of “the inorganic sciences” (chemistry, geology, astronomy) and even biology since they 
were (in the material mode) dealing with physical objects. However, since his main target was the 
physicalizability of protocol sentences, a separate argument was required, and he attempted to 
provide one in sections 4 of his “Physical Language.” 
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 In his “Physical Language” article he still maintained that protocol-sentences were the most basic sentences of 
science that could not themselves be doubted (438), but in response to Neurath’s critique, he revised this position to 
say that any scientific sentence within a physicalist system could function as a protocol sentence (“Über 
Protokollsätze” 224) and no sentence could function as an ultimate epistemic basis (225). 




3. The Psychophysical Underpinnings of Physicalized Protocol Sentences 
Carnap’s argument for the translatability of protocol sentences into physical sentences took the 
form of an empirical claim: He posited that it is possible to find a quantitative equivalent for 
every qualitative (protocol) sentence, and he noted that this is not a logical necessity but simply a 
contingent empirical fact, such that there is a functional dependency between protocol sentences 
and physical sentences. (In the material mode, it is an empirical fact about the way in which our 
experience is structured in relation to the physical world). From this, Carnap derived the claim 
that it is possible to find a corresponding physical sentence for every protocol sentence, a fact that 
provides the basis of the very possibility of practicing an intersubjective physics. 
It is clear that Carnap expected the physical sentences in question to be sentences about the brain, 
but realized that neuroscience at the time did not deliver sentences that directly corresponded to 
sentences about experiences. For this reason, he decided to describe the relevant brain states in 
terms of behavioural dispositions, specifically, the disposition to display particular behaviours in 
response to particular stimuli. This was made explicit in his subsequent “Psychology in a 
Physical Language,” but is already apparent in the way he explains his position in his 1932b 
paper. For example, he states that it is possible to establish empirical correlations between the 
qualitative statements of protocol sentences and the quantitative determination (in a physical 
language) of the conditions under which they are uttered. For example, when examining color 
vision, he argued, one has to vary “the physical conditions (e.g., the combination of various 
frequencies of oscillations) and discover the conditions to which S reacts with the protocol 
statements containing the qualitative terms in question” (Carnap 1963 [1932]; 408). Then he 
states “The discovery of the set of these physical terms corresponding to a definite qualitative 
term will be called the ‘physicalizing” … of this qualitative term” (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, Carnap does not provide a reference for this, but it is striking that there was in fact 
a research program that did just what Carnap was describing: i.e., vary physical stimulus 
conditions and measure responses. This research program, psychophysics, had famously been 
founded by Fechner (1860) and continues to be active until today (Heidelberger 2004). At the 
time of Carnap’s work in the 1930s, famous proponents of this research were members of the 
Berlin/Frankfurt school of Gestalt psychology, with whom Carnap was at least indirectly 






 I therefore suggest that Carnap was aware of psychophysical research 
and that his proposal to translate protocol sentences into sentences about behavioural dispositions 
was in fact inspired by this tradition.
3
 With this claim I do not wish to refute the common 
assumption that the position advocated here Carnap is a kind of logical or analytical 
behaviourism. My thesis, rather, is that Carnap’s articulation of this form of behaviourism (i.e., 
what Carnap called the “physicalizing” of qualitative terms), relied on a contingent empirical 
fact. And the way in which he imagined the empirical investigation of this fact was practiced by a 
particular (at the time quite dominant) approach within psychology. The implication I want to 
highlight here is that specific attempts to translate a psychological sentence (Mr A is angry) into 
physical sentence (Mr. A exhibits particular behaviors) are going to build on psychophysical 
research, which in turn will necessarily involve first-person data. 
 
4. Physical Language, Physicalized Observation Sentences and Psychology 
In his article “Psychology in a Physical Language” Carnap explored the implications of his 
physicalism for psychology as a science, specifically focusing on the question of the kinds of 
observation sentences were admissible in psychology. His targets were “observations of the 
mental states of others” (section 3) and “self-observations” (section 7). 
With regard to observation-statements about the mental states of others (e.g., “Mr A is angry”), 
Carnap argued that insofar as such sentences are meaningful at all, they are only meaningful if 
they can be translated into statements about physical behaviours (about Mr. A’s disposition to 
behave in certain ways). This allows for the derivation of sentences that state truth conditions for 
the sentence in question (about Mr. A’s actual behaviour), though (as Carnap lays out) to treat 
them as such requires an additional premise, namely that in general people display the behaviors 
in question when angry. Carnap uses this to argue that if we want to test a particular sentence 
about the content of someone’s mind, we have to (a) appeal to a general sentence about the kinds 
of physical conditions that need to be in place when we use the term “anger” and (b) point to a 
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 When discussing (both in his 1928 Aufbau and in his 1932 article about physical language) the question what are 
the units of experience that protocol language typically describes, he opted for those identified by Gestalt 
psychology. 
3
 Even if this historical thesis does not hold up, I maintain that psychologists at the time would have recognized the 
similarity (and that’s all that matters for my subsequent argument). 




particular set of physical conditions as instantiating the general conditions in question. Carnap 
then contrasts this (“rational”) mode of justification with one where the emotional state of Mr. A 
is ascertained in a more “intuitive” way. He argues, however, that such intuitive sentences are 
either meaningless or can be translated into one that states the physical conditions that provide it 
with meaning. In section 7, he picks up on this claim and says that the same is true of sentences 
about our own mental states: For example, when we utter a sentence like “I am nervous right 
now,” this sentence is either meaningless or its meaning is provided by empirical truth conditions 
in a physical language (shaky hands, sweaty palms, etc.).  
One might wonder whether (and if so, how) these considerations were relevant to the research 
practices of experimental psychology, as Carnap seems to suggest. In a nutshell, he had two 
answers to this: First, he claimed that by failing to appreciate his point about the semantics of 
psychological sentences, psychologists were prone to falling into a kind of psychophysical 
dualism (which is apparent, for example, when I say that I am in physical state X and in addition 
in mental state Y). Second, he cautioned against attributing a special kind of epistemic 
significance to first-person experiences (of other minds or of one’s own mind), pointing out 
instead that in science one always deals with sentences about experiences, which should be 
treated as the behavioural outputs of complicated detection devices under particular physical 
conditions: “In principle, there is at most a gradual epistemic difference between the utterances of 
a fellow human being and a barometer” (p.124; translation by me). (see also p. 140 for similar 
statements). 
Carnap repeatedly comments on the confused state of the then current psychology (for example 
“understanding” and “introspective” psychology), but he never quite says who is actually 
committing the above two errors. It is possible that he had in mind Wilhelm Dilthey, who had 
argued for understanding as a first-person mode of access to the subject matter of the human 
sciences. But Carnap’s critique is a little confusing by virtue of the fact that Carnap also throws 
in a different psychological approach (again without mentioning any names), which studies 
“purposeful behaviour.” I suggest that here Carnap had in mind the American neo-behaviorist 
Edward Chace Tolman, whom Carnap probably met at Vienna Circle meetings (or at least knew 
about via Egon Brunswick).
4
 Tolman emphasized the goal-directed nature of much behaviour and 
                                                          
4
 Tolman’s book, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men also appeared in 1932. 




essentially introduced proto-cognitive mental states to explain them. With respect to this 
explanatory practice, Carnap argues that it is acceptable as long as we realize that talk about 
purposes can be fully physicalized, i.e., translated into a language that specifies lawful 
regularities between specific stimuli and behavioural dispositions. It bears stressing that Dilthey’s 
approach was quite different from Tolman’s, insofar as the former talked about a mode of 
empirical access (understanding), whereas the latter talked about an explanatory concept 
(purpose). Hence, we can note that Carnap’s critique of psychology was fairly broad. 
While this does not come out in Carnap’s article, one other likely target of Carnap’s attack on 
psychology was the psychologist Karl Bühler, who was based in Vienna at the time. In 1927, just 
a few years before Carnap’s “Psychology in a Physical Language”, Bühler had published a book 
about what he had termed the “crisis of psychology” (Bühler 1927). In this book, Bühler 
specifically attacked the physicalism of Gestalt psychologists like Wertheimer, Köhler, and 
Koffka. According to Christoph Limbeck (2014), Carnap presented his ideas about a physicalist 
psychology in Bühler’s colloquium on two separate occasions in the summer of 1930, where they 
gave rise to heated discussions.
5
 In the light of the hypothesis that Carnap’s critique of 
contemporary psychology may have been directed at Bühler’s 1927 book, and the light of the fact 
that Bühler, in this book, specifically opposed what he took to be the “physicalism” of the Berlin 
school of Gestalt psychology, it is not surprising that members of this school took an interest in 
Carnap’s position. 
 
5. The Carnap/Duncker Exchange 
Carnap’s 1932a article prompted a reply by Carl Duncker, a younger member of the Berlin 
school of Gestalt psychologists. This reply (and Carnap’s subsequent response) demonstrates a 
deep mutual incomprehension. This is especially surprising in the light of my above thesis that 
Carnap’s physicalism was informed by the psychophysical tradition, and that Gestalt 
psychological research has to be placed in that tradition. In this section, I provide a brief 
overview of the exchange, followed (in section 6) by an elaboration of my thesis.  
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Even though it is clear, especially at the beginning of his article, that Duncker had misunderstood 
some of Carnap’s points, he did object to Carnap’s characterization of the two supposed problems 
of psychology, namely the danger of falling into a mind-body dualism and the tendency to 
attribute too much epistemic significance to introspective data. Carnap had argued that these two 
problems could be avoided if one took the general stance of behaviorism: “The position 
advocated here is essentially in agreement with the psychology known as ‘behaviorism’” (Carnap 
1932a, 124, translation by me).
6
 Duncker argued that Gestalt psychological findings and 
methodology were more congenial to what Carnap was aiming at.  
As mentioned above, Carnap claimed that his analysis of psychological sentences as translatable 
into physical ones could help psychologist avoid the inference that the two types of sentences 
referred to two separate kinds of “things.” Duncker responded with utter incomprehension, 
stating that he was not aware of many contemporary psychologists who made substantial 
metaphysical assumptions about mind and body (Duncker 1932, 165), and that Gestalt 
psychologists were in fact physicalists, though he did not think that this had any implications for 
the goals or methods of non-behaviorist psychology (ibid. 176). He backed this up by claiming 
that psychophysics also viewed organisms as detection devices, like Canap, and that they endorse 
a principle of isomorphism between mental and physical processes (Duncker 1932, 174). 
However, Duncker also used some careless formulations, which seemingly contradicted his anti-
metaphysical stance. For example, he asserted that it was possible to conceptualize anger both as 
a behavioural disposition and as an inner experience. For Carnap these assertions showed 
Duncker to be falling in exactly the metaphysical trap that Carnap had warned about (Carnap 
1932b, 186/7). Accordingly, Carnap responded with some surprise about Dunker’s claim to be a 
physicalist, noting that he and Duncker clearly had in mind very different notions of physicalism: 
Carnap’s physicalims was about the translatability of psychological language into physical 
language, whereas Duncker’s physicalism was about finding the physical basis of introspectively 
accessible experience. 
This brings us to Carnap’s second critique of psychology, namely that of introspective methods. 
Carnap’s rejection of introspection was closely related to his above-mentioned point about the 
dangers of being misled into a dualist metaphysical position. It was not aimed at the usage of this 
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method as such, but at certain interpretations of its results, with its inherent danger of reifying the 
object of introspection, a point he reiterates in his reply to Duncker. In his response, Duncker 
stated that (a) Gestalt psychology (like all of psychophysics) relied on some kinds of self-reports 
since it was not clear how psychophysical laws could be formulated otherwise, but (b) that one 
did not have to be a behaviorist to reject the assumption that psychology aims at the “absolute 
content of a quale” (Duncker 1932, 167). Moreover, (c) when psychophysicists investigated (for 
example) color vision, they were not interested in the subjective experience of the color as such, 
but in their “order properties” (“Ordnungseigenschaften”). For example, if an individual 
experienced inverted qualia, this was irrelevant for the language of science, so long as that person 
responded to all the same stimuli in the same way as a person with ‘normal’ experiences. All of 
these points then lead up to Dunckers’s somewhat exasperated question: “I ask once again, which 
‘interpretation’ of introspection is Carnap arguing against?”(Duncker 1932, 169). 
Summing up, Duncker held that an endorsement of introspection was compatible with a lean 
metaphysics and with the notion of biological organisms as physical detection devices. Yet, at the 
same time, he held that introspection was an indispensable tool for the empirical investigation of 
such devices. Carnap, in his reply, repeated that he did not care what tools psychologists used, so 
long as the resulting sentences could be stated in a physical language. Thus, he took Duncker’s 
conjectures to be irrelevant to his point. 
 
6. Some Underlying Issues 
In this section, I will argue that while it is true that Duncker misunderstood Carnap’s point, it is 
also the case that Carnap was not receptive to the implications of Duncker’s remarks, namely (a) 
that Carnap’s physicalism did not have much practical relevance to at least some non-behaviorist 
psychology as it was being practiced at the time (or to the extent that it did, Carnap had failed to 
engage with the targets of his critique), and (b) that Carnap’s physicalism was rooted in 
psychological research and hence he was well advised to engage with the foundations of that 
research. 
 




6.1 The Heuristic Function of Introspection 
Clearly, one issue at play in the exchange between Darnap and Duncker was a version of the 
distinction between discovery and justification, with Carnap declaring scientific methodology 
irrelevant to the epistemological status of psychological claims such as “Mr A is angry.” At that 
point in time, questions surrounding the production and epistemic status of first-person 
experiential reports had been debated within experimental psychology for well over half a 
century, following the work of Fechner, Brentano, G.E. Müller, and many others. The fact that 
Carnap simply ignored these debates must have seemed bizarre to a practicing scientist like Karl 
Duncker. Now, Carnap might have replied that those very discussions were themselves rooted in 
metaphysical assumptions, and that it was precisely for this reason that he was aiming at a purely 
formal analysis of scientific language rather than the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific 
practice. But the question is whether Carnap was entitled to this stance, since – as I argued above 
– his very conception of the physicalization of protocol sentence took for granted the project of 
psychophysics, that is, the project of discovering functional relationships between physicalist and 
mentalist descriptions. It is this fact that Duncker is also alluding to when arguing that even 
though experimental psychology mainly varies physical stimuli, this activity is heuristically 
guided by introspection (Duncker 173). This can be illustrated if we go back to Carnap’s claim 
(see section 4 above) that the empirical conditions of application for a psychological sentence 
(such as “Mr. A is angry”) were provided not only by an individual displaying the relevant 
behaviors, but also by an empirical law that described the types of behaviors typically displayed 
by angry people. Such laws, Carnap tells us, are the result of inductive generalizations. What 
Duncker is pointing out (on my construal) is that such generalizations are based on self-reports, 
and that therefore human subjectivity cannot be eliminated from the research process. 
Again, Carnap might have replied that it was precisely the (merely) heuristic nature of 
introspection that rendered it irrelevant to serious logical analysis, and moreover, that even in the 
actual research (as he and Duncker agreed) only the introspective reports (not the introspective 
experiences themselves) counted. But even if we grant this, I would like to suggest that some of 
the unproductive harshness of this exchange could have been avoided if Carnap had 
acknowledged his debts to the psychophysical tradition. This might have helped him understand 
why Duncker was so irritated by Carnap’s positive assessment of methodological behaviorism, 
since after all behaviorism, by virtue of not talking about mental states at all (physicalized or not) 




radically rejected the very method that Carnap’s physicalism was built on, namely that of treating 
experiential reports as relevant scientific data. I will now argue that it might also have helped him 
provide a more nuanced description of the kinds of mind-body parallelisms available at the time. 
 
6.2 Varieties of Mind-Body Parallelisms 
As indicated above, Duncker rejected Carnap’s claim that contemporary psychology’s use of the 
material mode was leading it down the road to mind-brain dualism. But what did Duncker have in 
mind here? 
Carnap’s turn to the analysis of language was motivated by his aim to avoid metaphysics. While 
this specific program of antimetaphysics is particularly well known, the mid- to late 19
th
 century 
had seen a lot of debates about banning metaphysics from scientific and philosophical discourses. 
In this vein, already Fechner, in his 1860 Elements of Psychophysics, had formulated an account 
of the psychophysical relationship that aimed to steer clear of fruitless debates between 
materialists and idealists at the time. His response was to argue that mental and physical 
properties were token identical, but depending on one’s perspective, one could only ever 
empirically apprehend one or the other and never both at the same time (Fechner 1860; 
Heidelberger 2004ab). While this type of position was often referred to as a kind of “parallelism” 
(see also Heidelberger 2003), a more apt description might be “dual-aspect theory,” since this 
term does not suggest the existence of distinct substances or properties, but merely of distinct 
perspectives. It was precisely this notion that underwrote Fechner’s empirical project of 
psychophysics. As Heidelberger (2003) explains, it is possible to distinguish between three layers 
of Fechner’s parallelism: an empirical hypothesis about the functional relationship between 
physical and psychological descriptions, a dual-aspect theory of the mind/body relationship, and 
a cosmological thesis, according to which even inorganic processes have a mental side to them. I 
have argued above that Carnap not only shared Fechner’s empirical hypothesis, but also his 
methodology of how to investigate this functional relationship (by varying stimuli and recording 
responses). While he clearly did not agree with Fechner’s mind-body theory (let alone with his 
cosmological thesis), it bears stressing that Fechner’s mind-body theory was not a kind of 
substance dualism. Rather, it was a dual aspect theory which scholars like Duncker may well 




have taken to lay the foundations for the very possibility of the psychophysical research that 
Carnap implicitly appealed to, when casting protocol sentences in terms of behavioural 
dispositions. 
Now, it is clear that for Carnap, the linguistic description of behavioural dispositions (expressed 
in a physical language) merely ensured the meaningfulness of psychological sentences, whereas 
for Fechner they expressed psychophysical laws, i.e., laws that describe the empirical relationship 
between two types of the magnitudes: experiences and physical stimuli. But given that Carnap’s 
semantic analysis also exploited (or at least assumed) the empirical relationship in question, it is 
well worth pointing out that Fechnerian psychophysics attempted to account for the existence of 
the empirical relationship without positing separate substances or even properties. By stating that 
the correspondence between the two languages was a crude empirical fact, Carnap may have been 
able to avoid metaphysical speculation, but there is also a sense in which this appeal is somewhat 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, it remains to me an open question to what extent Carnap’s thinking 
about this was implicitly informed by some version of the dual-aspect theory that had 
underwritten Fechner’s psychophysical research. Whether or not this was the case, I argue that 
for Duncker this may have been an intuitive way to think about the matter, which would account 
for his difficulties in comprehending Carnap’s point. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that Carnap’s account of protocol sentences (including those of psychology) was 
deeply informed by the psychophysical research tradition of the mid-19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries. 
In the light of this, I have provided an analysis of the exchange between Carnap and Duncker, in 
which Duncker questioned Carnap’s contention that the methodological approach of behaviorism 
within psychology was congenial to his approach, arguing instead that Gestalt psychology came 
much closer to Carnap’s outlook. I substantiated Duncker’s assessment by providing a reading of 
Duncker’s analysis that highlights the following two points: First, Gestalt-psychological research 
(and psychophysical research more generally), while giving a lot of weight to first-person 
experiential reports, did not necessarily invest them with epistemic certainty or treat them as 
being about irreducible qualia. Second, researchers in the psychophysical tradition (including 




Gestalt psychologists) were not necessarily committed to a mind-brain dualism, even if they 
aimed to formulate psycho-physical laws.  
Given that Carnap’s formal analysis relied on (or at least presupposed the possibility of) this 
research, I argue that it was unwise for Carnap to reject as irrelevant Duncker’s points, both 
because it unnecessarily alienated a potential psychological ally and because it prevented Carnap 
from acknowledging the extent to which he and Duncker shared similar philosophical roots. It 
also prevented him from recognizing that his project of physicalizing protocol sentences (in the 
formal mode) relied on research that granted some epistemic authority to subjective experience 
(in the material mode). 
In conclusion I argue that the way in which Carnap tried to insulate his philosophical project, as 
concerned with the “epistemological status” of psychological sentences, from the question of how 
such sentences are established was part of a general trend away from being concerned with 
scientific practice. While philosophy of psychology in the 19
th
 century had still been fairly 
practice-oriented (as evidenced, for example, in Fechner’s 1860 Elements of Psychophysics or 
Brentano’s 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint), the philosophical turn to formal 
analysis (along with the rise of behaviorism in the US), for some decades eclipsed the fact that 
much of psychology continued to make some use of first-person reports. As a result philosophers 
of psychology have only recently started to turn their renewed attention to questions about the 
meaning, role and justification of first-person reports in psychology’s research practices. In this 
context, the physicalist analyses of introspection, as they were provided by advocates of Gestalt 
psychology, are still well worth considering. (Feest 2014) 
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